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Abstract 
This survey first discusses general characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of different 
types of fiscal rules. The criterion for classifying them is based on the emphasis given: long-
term sustainability (reducing the deficit bias and controlling the growth in public debt) or 
reducing the procyclicality of fiscal policy (short-term stabilisation). It then reviews the 
experience with fiscal rules in seven Latin American countries, as their use has become more 
widespread since the early 2000s. Only Chile targets cyclically adjusted indicators, although 
Colombia is also taking that approach and the Mexican rule offers some stabilisation 
properties. Argentina, Brazil and Peru apply numerical rules targeting the overall/primary 
public balance and/or public spending. The Venezuelan framework has, in practice, been 
diluted after its introduction. The coverage of the rule depends on the degree of 
decentralisation of fiscal systems, with many countries including debt limits on the sub-
national governments as a key tool to face the common pool problem that emerges in federal 
states. All in all, fiscal rules in Latin America have been more effective in helping to strengthen 
long-term sustainability than in responding to shocks, as proved by the recent financial crisis. 
Fiscal rules have had to be fine-tuned over the years and a “second generation” of fiscal 
rules – combining the sustainability objective with greater flexibility to accommodate 
economic shocks – appears to be necessary in order to increase their efficiency. 
Keywords: fiscal rules, debt sustainability, fiscal policy stance, structural fiscal balance, 
fiscal impulse, stabilisation funds. 
JEL Classification: H60, H62, H77. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Este documento analiza, en primer lugar, las características generales, las ventajas y las desventajas 
de los diferentes tipos de reglas fiscales. El criterio seguido para clasificar las reglas fiscales es el 
énfasis que ponen en distintos posibles objetivos de aquellas: la sostenibilidad a largo plazo (reducir 
el sesgo hacia el déficit público y controlar el crecimiento de la deuda pública) o la reducción 
de la prociclicidad de la política fiscal (la estabilización a corto plazo). Esta clasificación se 
utiliza para analizar la experiencia con reglas fiscales en siete países de América Latina, 
donde su uso se ha generalizado en la primera década del siglo XXI. De entre estos países, 
solo Chile ha seguido una regla fiscal centrada en indicadores fiscales ajustados por el ciclo 
económico y por los precios de las materias primas, aunque Colombia también ha adoptado 
recientemente este enfoque y la regla fiscal mexicana cuenta con algunas propiedades de 
estabilización. En Argentina, Brasil y Perú se aplican reglas numéricas que tienen como meta el 
saldo fiscal (ajustado o no por el pago de intereses) y/o la evolución del gasto público. La regla fiscal 
venezolana, en la práctica, se diluyó después de su introducción. La cobertura institucional de las 
reglas fiscales depende del grado de descentralización de los sistemas fiscales. Así, los países 
más descentralizados incluyen límites de endeudamiento a los Gobiernos subnacionales como 
una herramienta clave para afrontar el problema del common pool que surge en los Estados 
federales. Con todo, las reglas fiscales en América Latina han resultado más eficaces para ayudar 
a fortalecer la sostenibilidad a largo plazo de la deuda pública que para dar respuesta a los 
shocks que afectan a las economías, como lo demuestra la reciente crisis financiera. Aunque 
las reglas fiscales se han ido ajustando a lo largo de los años, una «segunda generación» de 
reglas fiscales —que combinen el objetivo de sostenibilidad con más flexibilidad para 
adaptarse a los shocks económicos— resulta necesaria para aumentar su eficiencia. 
Palabras clave: reglas fiscales, sostenibilidad fiscal, posición de la política fiscal, saldo fiscal 
estructural, impulso fiscal, fondos de estabilización. 
Códigos JEL: H60, H62, H77.  
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1 Introduction 
According to standard economic policy, discretionary fiscal policy should be countercyclical. 
In the neoclassical smoothing model of Barro (1979), a government should optimally run 
surpluses in good times and deficits in bad times. That is the same a government should do, 
though for different reasons, in the standard Keynesian or neo-Keynesian framework. But the 
common ownership of public resources,1 principal-agent problems,2 time-inconsistency 
problems – i.e. the incentives not to adhere ex post to ex ante announcements – and political 
budget cycles3 create a bias towards fiscal deficits, leading to public expenditure distortions 
and procyclicality (pressures to overspend, in particular in good times). 
There is a wealth of evidence on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America 
(see Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky et al., 2005; Daude et al., 2011) which contributes to 
macroeconomic volatility, depresses investment in real and human capital, hampers growth, 
increases fiscal vulnerability and has led to many debt defaults in the history of the region. 
This procyclical nature of fiscal policy in Latin America has been exacerbated by: i) the relative 
scarcity, uncertainty and high volatility of revenues (with the exception of Brazil and, to a 
lesser extent, Argentina) as commodity-linked revenues (taxes, royalties, profits) can be a 
large portion of government revenue; ii) the pervasive rigidities in public expenditures (which 
have led to a concentration of fiscal adjustments in public investments); iii) the need for 
ensuring progress to reduce poverty and inequality, which are very high in the region; iv) the 
exposure of some countries in the region to pronounced economic fluctuations – shocks from 
sharp changes in the terms of trade as they are rich in commodities, price-takers and small, 
open economies – and to procyclical capital flows; and, v) in bad times (sudden stops and/or 
negative trade-related shocks), governments in emerging markets are credit-constrained 
while when times improve they are free to go on a debt-financed spending spree (see 
Alberola and Montero, 2006). Thus, avoidance of procyclicality and debt sustainability in the 
region requires first and foremost the creation of adequate “fiscal space” (saving revenue 
windfalls in good times) to prevent the emergence of such financing constraints in bad times, 
or to prevent the rapid changes in investor sentiment and ease the vulnerability to financial 
crises, especially given the small size of automatic stabilisers (stemming mainly from the 
limited tax bases due to informality, and the absence of generalised unemployment protection 
schemes). Numerical fiscal rules have emerged as the response to create the “fiscal space” in 
Latin America and to provide a credible medium-term anchor for public finances. 
Extensive empirical literature suggests that market discipline is certainly not a 
sufficient deterrent against deficit biases and/or fiscal procyclicality: if anything, the market 
seems to penalise fiscal profligacy in a discontinuous fashion only at a late stage. So, over the 
past two decades an increasing number of countries around the world have steadily adopted 
                                                                          
1. The common pool problem is the fact that recipients of public spending fail to fully internalise the costs that taxpayers 
must assume (Debrun and Kumar, 2007). For example, in a monetary union among sovereign nations or among sub-
national entities, there may be adverse externalities created by the loose fiscal behaviour of one member of the union for 
other members. This free rider behaviour of lower-level governments assumes that the central government and other 
lower-level governments will adopt a compensatory policy course, or that the central government will bail out sub-
national governments as they run into financial trouble. 
2. The principal-agent problems arise between voters and political authorities due to lack of representation of future 
generations, sensitivity to special-interest lobbies, corruption and use of asymmetric and biased information. 
3. Politicians are inclined to use public spending to advance their re-election prospects whenever an election 
approaches (Rogoff, 1990). See Nieto-Parra and Santiso (2010) for the analysis of political budget cycles in Latin 
American countries. 
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fiscal rules to tackle the above-mentioned problems.4,5 Broadly following Kopits and 
Symansky (1998), a fiscal rule is defined as a long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through 
numerical limits on budgetary aggregates (defined as standing commitments to specified 
numerical targets for some key budget and/or debt aggregates and to some procedures).6 
This rules-based framework is an application of the more general “rules rather than 
discretion” principle developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) 
in monetary policy (inflation bias is the result of discretion, but rules have a cost because they 
cannot include all possible contingencies and hence do not allow for an optimal response to 
unforeseen circumstances). In monetary policy the tension was motivated by the 1970s 
“Great Inflation”, was intellectually grounded in the rational expectations revolution in 
macroeconomics and was solved by delegating the task of conducting policy to an 
independent agency (the central bank) that can act with discretion but does not suffer from 
inflation bias, because it is either more conservative than society as a whole (Rogoff, 1985) or 
has incentive contracts (Walsh, 1995). 
In contrast to monetary policy rules and institutions, fiscal rules and institutions have 
received less attention from policymakers and academic researchers alike. Fiscal policy 
discretion may be beneficial under a number of circumstances (e.g. in the presence of 
unexpected shocks that require speedy policy action or virtuous politicians, especially in Latin 
American countries where the unexpected shocks are large and lack large automatic 
stabilisers). But as explained before, there is growing evidence that discretion can be 
misused, leading to deficit bias, or the implementation of procyclical fiscal policies. In addition, 
matters are more complicated in fiscal policy than in monetary policy because budget 
decisions are at the centre of the political process and hence cannot be delegated to a 
politically unaccountable agency, which could expand the efficiency frontier in the trade-off 
between flexibility and credibility (fiscal councils, unlike central banks in monetary policy, are 
simply watchdogs that provide independent assessment of fiscal policy). Kopits (2001) argues 
that having a set of permanent, well-designed and properly implemented fiscal rules 
establishes a more depoliticised framework for fiscal policy. In any case, although the ideal 
would be to adopt rules that allow for the highest credibility while limiting reduction in 
flexibility, they are bound to prevent an appropriate fiscal response in at least some 
circumstances. 
This survey focuses on a group of seven countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), bringing their fiscal rules under scrutiny.7 It 
explores a range of design features (the specific numerical target laid down by the rule, which 
can be expressed either as a percentage of GDP, in local currency units or a growth rate, and 
the period over which the rule is to be applied), statutory provisions (constitutional provisions, 
high-level legislation, ordinary legislation that applies to governments over successive electoral 
cycles or merely a policy guideline), the penalties for non-compliance (institutional or personal 
sanctions), institutional coverage (the level of government to which they apply) and operational 
arrangements (whether the rules include “escape clauses” – flexibility in special circumstances 
                                                                          
4. According to Schaechter et al. (2012), in 1990 only five countries had fiscal rules in place whereas by end-March 
2012 the number of countries with national and/or supranational fiscal rules surged to 76. Advanced economies were 
the frontrunners, but about a decade later rules were also adopted in a number of emerging economies. 
5. For Spain’s case see, for example, the article “The reform of the fiscal framework in Spain: constitutional limits and the 
new public spending growth rule”, published in the October 2011 edition of the Banco de España’s Economic Bulletin. 
6. Fiscal rules can also serve other objectives: to contain the size of government and to support inter-generational equity. 
7. In five of these countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) fiscal policy rules have been embedded in an 
inflation targeting regime. 
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such as natural disasters and severe recessions –). Table 1 presents a summary of these key 
components of their fiscal rules. After this introduction, Section 2 analyses the different forms 
of fiscal rules from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 describes the individual country 
experiences with fiscal rules. Section 4 presents a general assessment of the fiscal rules in 
the region and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
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2 Types of fiscal rules 
Although fiscal rules have in common as its main objective to promote consistency with the 
intertemporal budget constraint, they take varied forms depending on the emphasis on long 
term sustainability (reduce the deficit bias and control the growth in public debt) or in reducing 
procyclicality of fiscal policy (short term stabilisation).8 The first type of rules (those mainly 
based on signaling a commitment to fiscal sustainability) are based on numerical targets 
imposed on: i) the public debt defined in terms of revenues, debt service costs of GDP (stock 
indicators of fiscal performance); and/or, ii) flow indicators of fiscal performance (public 
deficits, primary public deficits, total revenue, total expenditure or specific spending 
categories) at various levels of government. In some cases a termed “golden rule” (in which 
investment spending is excluded) is used to prevent crowding out much-needed public 
investment.9 These numerical fiscal rules may also include borrowing rules (e.g., prohibition of 
central bank financing). Potential disadvantages of numerical fiscal rules include lack of 
flexibility in fiscal policy, procyclical biases in some cases,10 and incentives to rely on low 
quality measures to meet the targets. They can even foster the adoption of practices to 
circumvent numerical rules (reclassification of expenditures from current to capital items, 
using off-budget public entities to perform government operations, using debt instruments not 
covered in debt limits, creative accounting, etc.).11 
The second type of fiscal rules (with mainly a character of allowing fiscal policy to 
respond acyclically or countercyclically to changing macroeconomic circumstances) is based 
on: i) a balanced budget requirement specified in a multiyear or medium-term context public 
deficit over the cycle; or on, ii) numerical targets for the structural or cyclically-adjusted 
balance for each year (taking into account cyclical variables critical to the public deficit such 
as GDP and/or prices of key commodities or, put it in a different way, to distinguish the part 
due to changes in the environment and the part due to changes in policy). But the definition of 
a medium-term objective includes the temptation to take some leeway in the short term and 
count on correction at the end of the cycle. In the second case, structural balances,12 it raises 
a number of analytical issues as it is key to have a reliable indicator of the cyclical position of 
the economy (output gap), the equilibrium price of some commodities and the extent to which 
individual budgetary items react to fluctuations in output (budgetary elasticities) and 
commodity prices. For example, if output grows fast and is attributed to structural increases, 
the rule would imply that spending should be increased permanently. However, should the 
output increase be reversed, the government would be stuck with higher, difficult to reverse 
expenditure outlays. This suggests that government should be conservative in estimates of 
structural growth and revenue and may require depositing contingency reserves in a 
stabilisation fund, generated from fiscal surpluses during economic booms, and allow 
                                                                          
8. With a procyclical fiscal policy, budget deficits are asymmetric across the business cycle rising during recessions but 
not falling as much during booms. Thus averaged over the business cycle the budget deficit will be higher. As a 
consequence, public debt levels experience a ratchet effect. 
9. See Carranza et al. (2011) for an analysis regarding public infrastructure investment and fiscal frameworks. In any case 
all capital expenditure is not necessarily productive and there are items such as health care and education expenditure 
than could raise potential growth even more. 
10. With expenditure ceilings, procyclicality can arise from the revenue side (during boom periods, governments might 
be tempted to cut taxes or increase tax expenditures). And as these rules set ceilings, not floors, for public expenditure, 
do not necessarily avoid procyclicality during downturns. 
11. See Milesi-Ferretti (2004). 
12. In addition, with a structural or cyclically adjusted balance type of rule, while interest payments is the only 
expenditure item not directly under the control of policy makers, excluding them from the rule weakens the link to debt 
sustainability. Similarly, “golden rules” are less linked to debt. 
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withdrawals to finance deficits during recessions. But the creation of these stabilisation funds 
requires not only distinguish transitory from permanent price shocks, but also to lay down 
rules for a transparent administration. 
There are, therefore, significant trade-offs between the two main types of fiscal rules. 
Firstly, the objective of transparency and simplicity argues for the choice of fiscal rules that are 
simple and easily monitored (those based on numerical targets for the overall budget balance, 
the public expenditure or the gross public debt). Nonetheless, such rules do not provide 
adequate flexibility to accommodate large unexpected shocks nor may they help avoid 
procyclicality of budgetary policies. In addition, in the case of expenditure rules, they should 
be complemented by balance –  or debt –  based rules in order to ensure debt sustainability. 
On the other hand, cyclically adjusted fiscal balances are regularly used by international 
organizations and national institutions, but budgetary targets are seldom framed in cyclically 
adjusted terms. This reflects in part the relative complexity of the techniques used for the 
estimation of output gaps, long term commodity prices, and budgetary elasticities.13,14 
Moreover, as time passes subsequent computation of structural measures for a given period 
can give different results as revisions are made to past data.15 The above problems are more 
important in emerging market countries as shocks to trend growth are the primary source of 
fluctuations in emerging markets, thus blurring the simple distinction between trend and cycle 
(see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). Structural deficit rules also generate a communication 
nightmare. In summary, fiscal rules which are simpler, more transparent and easily monitored 
may not help avoid procyclicality of budgetary policies and/or may not provide adequate 
flexibility to accommodate large unexpected shocks. 
The implementation of the fiscal rules can be limited to the national government or 
can also include other levels of government. Multiple levels of government multiply the 
possible reasons for failure of fiscal responsibility. Decentralisation, which has increased in 
recent decades, reflecting primarily political pressures, has reduced the central administrative 
control over subnational fiscal behaviour.16 As a result, subnational governments (SNGs 
hereafter) now account for substantial shares of public expenditures, in particular social and 
investment ones. When SNGs are included, provisions can be adopted either with a top-down 
or a bottom-up approach to ensure that they do not accumulate unsustainable debts and/or 
contingent liabilities, ultimately requiring either bailouts from the central government or abrupt 
adjustment programs. The top-down approach under the surveillance of a central authority is 
usually introduced against the background of past bailouts or under some form of implicit or 
explicit guarantees to rescue SNGs in distress. Therefore, fiscal rules are especially useful in 
circumstances where markets cannot exert adequate discipline on national or subnational 
governments.17 It is far more difficult to establish consistent fiscal rules through a bottom-up 
approach, in which SNGs may adopt voluntary binding rules which can be ineffective. In that 
case, the central government must set a proper example and provide incentives for SNGs to 
                                                                          
13. There is considerable evidence suggesting that, regardless of the methodology used, the estimates of the output 
gaps are generally subject to considerable margins of error, especially at the end of the sample period. See IMF (2012) 
for an example of three different structural balance estimates for Peru. However, discrepancies in terms of fiscal impulse 
are smaller. 
14. See IMF (2011b). 
15. Revisions of the gap estimates are often of the same order of magnitude and may even exceed of the gap itself (see 
Orphanides et al., 2002). See as an example “The pain in Spain will test the euro” by Martin Wolf in Financial Times 
(March 6, 2012). 
16. See Ter-Minassian and Jiménez (2011) for an analysis of fiscal decentralisation in Latin America. 
17. The pre-conditions for effective market discipline are indeed demanding: i) credibility of no bailouts; ii) absence of 
privileged financing channels; iii) availability of reliable and timely information on government finances. They rarely are fully 
satisfied, even in advanced countries. 
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adopt prudent fiscal policies. It is also important the particular political structure of the country. 
The federal countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) tend to be more fiscally decentralized and 
the national government cannot decide unilaterally. By contrast, in the unitary countries 
(Colombia and Peru) the constitution gives the national government power to legislate in all 
areas and to decide unilaterally what powers and fiscal resources it will delegate to SNGs. 
Consensus and political commitment to the rules are vital for their success. Rules 
with no broad social and political agreement are unlikely to be effectively implemented and in 
cases of major political volatility can easily end up being ignored. When fiscal credibility is low 
and institutions weak, not only may such rules be fiscally ineffective, but non-enforcement 
may weaken yet further the fragile institutional context which made them so ineffective to 
begin with. Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) found that a higher (lower) government surplus (deficit), 
higher government stability, a higher per capita GDP, a lower dependency ratio and 
countercyclical government spending raise the likelihood of adopting a fiscal rule. Additionally, 
such rules can contribute to stability and growth only if they are properly designed and they 
take into account country-specific historical, cultural, political, and economic conditions (non-
renewable resource endowment, fiscal decentralisation, and other structural characteristics). 
Moreover, the political and social acceptability of a fiscal rule is also likely to be 
enhanced if they are included in fiscal responsibility laws. These laws extend the concept to 
rules of procedure that govern the fiscal policy-making process (procedures rules with a view 
to establishing good practices and raising predictability) and transparency rules that 
determine what fiscal information has to be made public and provide accountability 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, in this survey we will not use such broader definition of fiscal rules 
and we will focus on numerical rules, not procedural or transparency ones. 
The political costs of breaching the rule will also increase if an impartial body (an 
independent fiscal watchdog) is charged with overseeing its implementation (rather than making 
decisions) as it significantly reduces the risks of politically motivated manipulations of the rule. 
This is especially the case with rules like structural balance based ones, which involve complex 
and technically demanding calculations. Therefore, fiscal councils work as complements, rather 
than substitutes, to fiscal rules. In any case, even independent experts are susceptible to the 
bias of overestimating or underestimating potential growth or commodity prices. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1208 
3 Country experiences with fiscal rules in Latin America  
In this Section we review the experiences with fiscal rules in seven Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
3.1 Argentina 18 
The first fiscal responsibility law in Argentina (Ley Nº 2.152 de Administración de los Recursos 
Públicos) was passed in 1999 and it became known to the public as the “fiscal convertibility 
law”. Following the impact of the Russian crisis and the Brazilian devaluation, Argentina was 
in recession, deflationary pressures were becoming more and more evident, and concern 
about the sustainability of the public accounts was spreading within and beyond the country. 
The strength of the convertibility system was called into question and the fiscal situation was 
seen as one of its weakest links. With an economy that had stopped growing and financing 
difficult to obtain, the government had to provide an assurance that it would adjust the 
accounts in future to whatever extent necessary. Passing Law Nº 25,152 was a way of doing 
this. The numerical rules of this law were set to follow a gradual deficit reduction timetable 
starting in 1999 and culminating with fiscal balance in 2003. Public spending growth was 
made conditional on GDP growth including the condition that primary spending could not be 
raised if economic activity declined. The fiscal rule followed a bottom-up approach, inviting 
subnational governments (provinces) to pass their own fiscal responsibility legislation. A Fiscal 
Countercyclical Fund was also established, to be financed out of extraordinary concession 
and privatization receipts and a set percentage of tax revenues. It could accumulate 
resources up to a maximum of 3% of GDP, to be used during the recessionary phase of the 
economic cycle. The bill did not contain an escape clause that allowed numerical limits to be 
breached: the difficulty of raising public financing made it unthinkable for Argentina to increase 
its fiscal deficit as a countercyclical response to the recession affecting its economy. 
The results of Law N.º 25,152 were disappointing. It was promoted mainly to give 
positive signs overseas, fulfilling the commitments made with the IMF, get better credit ratings 
and restore credibility in the markets. But its implementation in the early 2000s coincided with 
the doomed efforts to prevent the collapse of the convertibility regime, which was ultimately 
abandoned in late 2001 in the midst of a deep political, economic and social crisis. The deficit 
limits laid down in the law were modified in 2000 (its first year of implementation) to provide 
for a longer period of convergence to fiscal balance and then disregarded. At the same time, 
SNGs were not covered by the law, despite being responsible for a large share of the 
consolidated fiscal deficit. The Fiscal Countercyclical Fund was set up, but it never had the 
resources to operate in the way it was designed to. 
As a matter of fact, in the second half of 2001 (months before the political and 
economic crisis), the authorities tried to implement an extreme fiscal rule, far more ambitious 
in scope than the unenforced Law Nº 25,152. It was known publicly as the “zero deficit law” 
and formally enacted by a reform to financial administration Law Nº 24,156. It was meant to 
apply a very simple principle: monthly expenditure could not be higher than current public 
revenues. Although very simple, the law proved to be wholly impracticable. In fact, when the 
convertibility system collapsed, it was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice. 
                                                                          
18. The main sources for this section are Braun and Gadano (2007), IMF (2005), and Melamud (2010). 
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The amendment establishing the zero deficit was removed from Law Nº 24,156 by an article 
in the 2003 budget act. 
After the crisis of late 2001 the Law Nº 25,152 remained formally in force but its 
prescriptions were not complied with or were suspended by articles included in the budget 
laws for each financial year (f.e., suspending payments into the Fiscal Countercyclical Fund). 
The scale of the problems that had to be resolved (suspension of payments on the public 
debt, rescheduling of bank deposits, the breaking of public service contracts, high 
unemployment) meant that complying with the rules approved by law in 1999 became a non-
priority issue. 
In 2004 Congress approved a new fiscal responsibility law (Ley Nº 2.917 Régimen 
General de Responsabilidad Fiscal). Under this legislation, for the national government and 
the provinces which decided to be under the Law Nº 25,917 (21 out of 24 provinces in 2010): 
i) the variation in nominal current public spending cannot exceed the nominal GDP growth 
rate19 and capital expenditure growth may exceed the GDP increase in those jurisdictions that 
satisfy the debt indicator criterion or the nominal growth rates of resources (current and 
capital) exceed the nominal rate of growth of GDP; ii) the public debt service over current 
revenue (after deduction of revenue-sharing transfers to municipalities) cannot be above 15% 
for provinces20 and the federal government public debt/GDP ratio has to be reduced in 
subsequent fiscal years (considering three-year periods for the federal government); and, iii) all 
jurisdictions are required to balance revenue and expenditure, excluding investment in basic 
social and economic infrastructure (most capital spending) and current spending financed by 
international financial institutions and those provinces in which the debt criterion is not fulfilled 
(as set in ii)) should achieve a primary surplus. Additionally, all administrations are enjoined to 
create fiscal countercyclical funds.  
The vicissitudes of Argentina’s testing relationship with the IMF and the conditional 
financial assistance provided by the central government to the provinces strongly influenced 
the substance of Law Nº 25,917. In 2003 the Argentine government committed to send two 
bills to Congress in order to sign a 3-year stand by agreement with the IMF: a revised tax 
revenue-sharing (with the provinces) law and a new fiscal responsibility legislation. But only 
the bill for the fiscal responsibility law was presented. However, the relationship between the 
national government and the provinces was an issue that permeated the contents of the law. 
The complex fiscal and financial relationship between the centre and the provinces, 
dominated by the delayed reform to the federal revenue-sharing regime, was significantly 
affected by the crisis of 2001. Provinces in Argentina have strong constitutional rights. 
Expenditure is fairly decentralized, tax collection centralized and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations leave the federal government substantial discretion in assisting provinces in financial 
distress. A number of subnational administrations had increased their expenditure and 
borrowings too far during the boom period in the nineties and were having the utmost 
difficulty in adapting to a less favorable environment. As revenues and financing dried up, 
many administrations had resorted to issuing quasi-currencies as the only way of meeting 
basic administrations costs, principally the salaries of public-sector employees. By February 
2002, the new national government had reached a fiscal agreement with the provinces that 
                                                                          
19. Except for periods of negative nominal GDP growth when nominal primary spending at most can stay constant. 
20. In those cases which exceed the limit, five-year plans that tend to locate within the parameters have to be designed. 
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was designed to resolve the most critical aspects of the situation.21 The debts of the 
provinces were assumed by the national government by means of a debt swap which 
converted foreign currency debts into peso-denominated debts at an exchange rate of 1.4 
Argentine pesos per dollar. The new debt of the provinces to the national government had a 
lower net present value, a longer repayment period (16 years), a 3-year grace period and a 
lower real interest rate (2%). In return for financial assistance from the federal government, 
some administrations in the greatest fiscal and financial difficulties undertook bilateral 
agreements with the centre known as ordered financing programs (PFOs) to reduce their 
imbalances and to not increase their borrowings. As collateral of the loans, the provinces 
agreed to transfer their rights over federal revenue-sharing resources to the national 
government. The agreements included penalties for non-compliance by the provinces. 
The PFOs strongly influenced the contents of the Law Nº 25,917, which became a 
means to give greater institutional backing to these bilateral financing agreements between 
the national government and the provinces. This law followed a bottom-up approach for 
subnational finances but was adopted by most of the provinces (21 out of 24). The fiscal rules 
share with the PFOs the goal of capping the provinces’ public debt, and contain similar 
penalties for non-compliance. But these penalties are rather vague and leave their 
specification to the internal charter of a fiscal watchdog (Consejo Federal de Responsabilidad 
Fiscal), which was created to oversee and coordinate the application of the law. Its members 
are representatives of the national and provincial governments and it is empowered to impose 
penalties for non-compliance that ranges from public disclosure of any breaches to the partial 
withholding of budgetary transfers from the centre (other than revenue-sharing resources), 
although the federal government has the power to veto any penalty. Also in the interests of 
fiscal transparency, this law established an obligation to prepare and publish standardized 
multiyear budgetary information for the national government and provinces. Each year, the 
national government was obliged to present a macrofiscal framework that would be used as 
an input for preparing the budget in all administrative districts. 
Regarding the record of the new law, Argentina improved significantly its fiscal 
accounts in recent years as public revenues grew along with economic activity.22 However, as 
seen in Table 2, the most important numerical rule of the new law (linking spending growth to 
GDP growth) has only been met since 2007 due to the exclusion of certain expenditures from 
current public spending: i) in 2007 and 2008, expenditure made in education to fulfil the goals 
of Article 2 of Law No. 26,075 (increase of public investment in education) was excluded; 
and, ii) in 2009, 2010 and 2011, expenditures linked to Law Nº. 26,530, targeted to face the 
recent financial crisis, were excluded as well. In fact, the fiscal responsibility law revised in 
2004 has been effectively suspended by Congress since 2009. In addition Law Nº 26,124 
(passed in August 2006) grants “emergency superpowers” to the President, with flexibility to 
allocate spending items within the budget. Lastly, the monitoring body established by law 
(Consejo Federal de Responsabilidad Fiscal) is not independent. In summary, frequent 
amendments have weakened the fiscal laws and their effectiveness in influencing the 
decision-making of the government. 
 
                                                                          
21. Acuerdo Nación-Provincias sobre Relación Financiera y Bases de un Régimen de Coparticipación Federal de 
Impuestos, signed on 27 February 2002 and ratified by Law Nº 25,570. 
22. Argentina experienced a public debt default at the end of 2001 and a restructuring of the public debt in 2005 (with a large 
haircut) that substantially reduced debt service obligations in the period and which could give a misleading picture of the fiscal 
consolidation effort when viewed from the perspective of developments in the different measures of the fiscal deficit. 
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Regarding provinces, many of them have complied with some of the law’s 
procedural requirements, but some did not meet the quantitative targets even before the 
onset of the global crisis in 2009. After the crisis, a Programa Federal de 
Desendeudamiento (Decree Nº 60/2010) allowed for a new restructuring of eligible 
provincial debts affected by the deterioration of their fiscal balances and eighteen provinces 
have benefited from such programs.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the Argentine GDP-indexed bonds23 that were 
introduced in the context of the 2005 debt restructuring. These instruments, by being closely 
linked to the ability of the country to service its debt obligations, reduce the pressure to 
implement procyclical fiscal policies in downturns.  
3.2 Brazil 24 
Fiscal results in Brazil showed a significant deterioration after the Plan Real was adopted in 
1994. This deterioration in fiscal performance was somewhat expected, since the drop in 
inflation meant the end of an important stabilizing factor for a balanced budget. The significant 
increase in discretionary spending and the increase in interest payments, resulting from high 
interest rates set by the central bank to maintain the strength of the exchange rate, also 
contributed to this deteriorating public finances. All these elements led to a significant 
expansion of the funding needs of the public sector and increased public debt, which was 
also increased by the cost of bank restructuring plans.25 
A broad effort to improve Brazilian public finances began in the mid 1990s. In 
particular, a subnational debt restructuring program was launched in 1997.26 As a result, the 
federal government entered into bilateral contracts with most states which included a 
program of fiscal adjustment and debt reduction in exchange for help with unsustainable 
subnational debt.27 The contracts/programs proved to be key not only to achieve subnational 
                                                                          
23. The Argentine government does not pay a certain coupon if GDP growth is below 3%. 
24. The main sources for this section are IMF (2009a) and the literature cited therein. 
25. See Giambiagi and Ronci (2004) for an analysis of the evolution of fiscal policy during the Real Plan and thereafter. 
26. Ley Nº 9.496 de 1997. The relation between the federal government and states are marked by a history of bailouts 
until the mid-1990s. Major rescue operations by the federal government include bailouts in 1989, 1993 and 1994. Each 
initial agreement that tried to resolve a crisis actually made the next crisis more likely, because they reinforced the 
perception that the federal government would provide debt relief reducing the effectiveness of market discipline. See 
Bevilaqua (2000) for further discussion. 
27. Federalism in Brazil revived in the 1980s with the return of democracy from military rule. The 1988 constitution gave 
states significant authority and resources, including a much broader revenue base for the state-level VAT, but did not 
specify their spending responsibilities or set rules for fiscal prudence. 
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fiscal consolidation (25 out of 27 signed the rescheduling agreement),28 but also as an 
effective tool for fiscal coordination in the federation. 
In 1998, Brazil adopted a Fiscal Stabilisation Program and reached an agreement 
with the IMF that sought to increase the primary surplus of federal and subnational entities 
(heavily based on tax increases), restructure debt, reform the budget process and promote a 
reform of the administration and social security. The adoption of a fiscal responsibility law in 
2000 (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas Municipais)29 was a key milestone. 
Being a complementary law (almost constitutional level), it requires a qualified majority (two-
thirds) for approval and modification, and it is binding for all entities of the public sector at all 
levels of government. It introduces the use of fiscal targets (primary surplus) and 
spending/debt limits. It does not specify quantitative targets or limits for all items, but requires 
that they are specified in separate legislation and regulations. Among them: 
• The target is defined in terms of the primary balance,30 is expressed in levels in the 
annual Law on Budget Directives and is binding for the first year (although parliament can 
change it during the year). It must also include projections for the budget balance, 
expenditure and debt for the two following years and a description of fiscal risks with an 
assessment of contingent fiscal liabilities. 
• The ratio of net public debt-to-net revenues cannot exceed 3.5 for the federal 
government, 2 for states and 1.2 for municipalities. 
• There are also specific limits on new spending and borrowing in the last year of a 
government. 
• There are maximum limits on personnel expenditure, as a proportion of net current 
revenues (federal: 50%, states: 60% and municipalities: 60%) and include both active and 
retired public servants. 
• Any new permanent expenditure has to be “affordable”: it cannot be created without 
reducing other expenditure or introducing new taxes. 
• The law strengthens the institutional fiscal framework of all areas of budget 
preparation, implementation and reporting (2-monthly, 4-monthly, annual). 
The law puts strong emphasis on procedural and transparency rules. It also includes 
procedures to monitor implementation of targets, corrective measures to be taken in case of 
any breaches and respective sanctions for all levels of government (including institutional and 
personal sanctions -fines, dismissal, prohibition to run for elections and even jail).31 The law  
 
                                                                          
28. The Federal Government assumed the state debts and refinanced it in 30 years with fixed 6% real interest rate. Each 
state was committed to a monthly payment up to an amount equivalent to 13 percent of its net revenue. If the amount 
due exceeded this limit, the difference is capitalized to the debt stock. It was the first time that the bailout was followed 
by an explicit obligation on the part of the states to commit themselves to an agreed-upon fiscal adjustment program, 
including a declining path for the state debt. 
29. The Brazilian experience is also valuable for the public consultation process that spanned to a high degree of 
consensus. 
30. The primary balance target was chosen at a time when securities paying floating interest rates and indexed to the 
exchange rate represented the bulk of traded public debt and, therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio was extremely sensitive 
to these variables. 
31. The Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas Municipais is supported by a Fiscal Crime Law. 
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includes flexibility clauses which are triggered by a significant deceleration in economic 
activity32 or a natural disaster but can only be invoked with Congressional approval. 
The law also places a series of restrictions on relations between public agencies and 
levels of government to prevent bail-outs, monetization of deficits, and misuses of public 
financial institutions. In particular, it prohibits any new credit arrangement between entities of 
the public sector, as well as the direct deficit financing of any kind by the Central Bank. 
Furthermore, state-owned financial institutions are prohibited to lend any money to their 
controlling agency. Despite provisions in the law, no institution is mandated to provide an 
independent view on the government’s proposed fiscal framework, policies, and 
macroeconomic assumptions. 
Fiscal performance in Brazil started to improve before the implementation of the Lei 
de Responsabilidade Fiscal e Finanças Publicas Municipais and remained strong after 
adopting it. As seen in Table 3 the fiscal targets were reached but expenditure growth in real 
terms picked up significantly since 2003 (stronger economic performance leading to higher 
tax collection contributed to reaching the targets). Net public debt (excluding the state-owned 
utilities Petrobras and Electrobrás) declined steadily from its peak in 2002 of 60% of GDP to 
around 40% of GDP in 2010, but gross debt remains relatively high in comparison with other 
emerging economies. The composition of debt also changed during the period, with a 
reduction in the share of foreign currency debt (external public debt is well below FX reserves 
at the central bank), a lengthening in average maturity and a rise in the share of fixed-rate 
instruments. In addition, the institutional framework required by the law has also improved 
reporting, accounting, and transparency (ample and more frequent reporting on fiscal 
developments and easier access by the public to fiscal data). 
Significant changes to the law have been introduced in recent years. A sovereign 
wealth fund was established in 2008 (Fundo Soberano do Brasil) to be used as a 
countercyclical instrument. The fund also aims at smoothing exchange rate volatility and 
promoting investment. So far it has been used only in 2008 to accumulate part of the fiscal 
overperformance (0.5% of GDP injected in 2009). Incentives embodied in the fiscal framework 
do not seem to be sufficient to put money aside during good times. The fiscal target was also 
modified as the government was allowed to exclude part of the investment spending from the 
calculation of the target. An additional modification of the target resulted from the exclusion of 
Petrobas (the state oil company) from the fiscal targets starting in 2009. 
                                                                          
32. Negative or economic growth below 1% in the previous four quarters, and natural disasters let governments have a 
longer period to adjust to limits imposed by the law but can only be invoked with Congressional approval. 
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The international financial crisis in 2008-09 put the fiscal framework to the test and 
Brazil was able to adopt countercyclical fiscal policy apart from the full operation of automatic 
stabilisers (mainly through temporary and targeted tax cuts and a reduction of the primary 
fiscal balance target). In addition, the government also started to give loans to public banks, 
which have been recorded as transactions in financial assets with no impact on the fiscal 
target (quasi-fiscal operations). While the fiscal response to the crisis was effective, there was 
a weakening of fiscal transparency and the credibility of the fiscal framework may have 
suffered (uncertainty about the use of the investment adjustor, the exclusion of ad hoc 
expenditures or about how to account for sizeable policy lending). 
3.3 Chile 33 
The adoption of a structural budget balance-based rule was announced in May 2000 by 
President Lagos, following intense technical preparations in the early months of his mandate. 
Chile’s fiscal rule seeks to insulate expenditure from cyclical fluctuations of real GDP growth 
and key mineral export prices. The adoption came at the end of a long period during which 
the public debt was reduced from 165% in 1985 to 20% of GDP in 2000 and with the 
intention of solidifying and codifying the emerging fiscal discipline. The institutional coverage 
applied in the construction of the structural balance (not the primary structural balance) is the 
Central Government (excluding public enterprises, municipalities and public universities). 
In summary, the fiscal rule follows three steps. First, cyclically adjusted revenues (t) 
based upon trend growth and long-term copper prices are estimated. Second, a target for 
the cyclically adjusted balance is set (b*). Third, government spending (g) is derived. Once a 
target is set for a year, the rule only allows the operation of automatic stabilisers. 
gt = tt –bt*, with g, t and b* as percentages of GDP in a given year. 
All the variables and parameters used in the calculation of the structural balance 
were initially estimated by the Ministry of Finance, but within a year or so, with a view to 
strengthening the credibility of the estimates, the government appointed two panels of 
independent experts to set them (the trend GDP Committee and the Committee of the 
reference price of copper which offer values of fundamental parameters for the estimation of 
cyclically adjusted revenues). It also made changes in response to the composition of public 
revenues, as adjusted for the molybdenum price (average of the last seven years since there 
are not a sufficient number of experts to set a committee) and private mining (which recorded 
a significant increase as a proportion of revenues). In addition, adjustments are made to 
public spending during the year, aimed at meeting the target ex post. 
The cyclically adjusted target for the central government was initially set at a surplus 
of 1% of GDP (from 2001 to 2007) in order to yield resources to recapitalize the central bank, 
lower the public debt-to-GDP ratio, accumulate financial assets, as counterpart to the 
ongoing gradual depletion of copper resources and prefinance contingent labour liabilities as 
well as social benefits (guaranteed minimum pensions and old-age benefits). Having achieved 
these goals, the target was reduced to a surplus of 0.5% of GDP in 2008 and to balance in 
2009 and 2010 to support the economy during the global crisis. In fact, there is no limit to the 
possibility of changing the target, not even any standard procedure to do so. 
                                                                          
33. The main sources for this section are Caballero et al. (2011), Dabán (2011), and Ffrench-Davis (2010). 
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Compliance with structural balance targets in Chile is not legally binding and the rule 
does not establish the path of return when there are deviations from the goal and does not 
provide penalties resulting from these deviations. However, successive governments have 
reiterated their commitment with set targets and mostly complied with them. The 2006 Ley Nº 
20.128 sobre Responsabilidad Fiscal institutionalized key aspects of the structural balance 
rule framework (without forcing the government to commit to a specific target not specifying 
procedures for its calculation). This law also included the creation of the Fondo de 
Estabilización Económica y Social34 where overall fiscal surpluses are deposited and deficits 
can be financed from. Its value declined from a peak of $22.7 billion (13.3% of GDP) in 2008. 
This drop was the result of withdrawals of $9.4 billion (5.8% of GDP) in 2009 aimed at 
propping up growth without resorting to international assistance. This fund totalled $13.2 
billion (5.4% of GDP) in December 2011. Another fund (the Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones 
with a pre-specified range for annual deposits as a ratio to GDP) was also created to face 
pension liabilities in the future and totalled $4.4 billion (2.1% of GDP) in December 2011. 
Moreover, to prevent that the growth of both funds generated a domestic credit boom, the 
deposits were made offshore. A financial advisory committee (Comité Financiero) supervises 
both Funds as embedded in the 2006 law.  
Various analyses35 have found evidence that the Chilean structural balance rule 
together with the stabilitization fund have contributed significantly to reducing procyclicality, 
spending volatility, output volatility, interest rate volatility, appreciation of the real exchange 
rate in boom times and sovereign risk. The rule, while undergoing technical modifications over 
time, was met throughout the period in a situation of strong consensus and political support 
for the rule, but was somewhat eased in the last years before the financial crisis. Thus, during 
the period 2000-05 the average growth of public spending was very close to GDP growth 
(4.4% and 4.3%, respectively). However, in the period 2006-08 public spending shows an 
average increase of 8.1%, while GDP grew by only 4.3%. And the fiscal stimulus package 
announced in January 2009 to underpin economic growth in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis moved further away the structural outcome of the goal of 0%36 (see Table 4). 
The rule requires only that fiscal policy be acyclical37 and the government went beyond this 
and undertook an active countercyclical policy to face the international crisis on a 
discretionary basis through relaxation of the target and methodological adjustments aimed at 
maximizing cyclically adjusted revenue (a de facto escape clause). This led to target 
underperformance, intertemporal inconsistency of the indicator and reduced transparency to 
calculate the structural balance (from adjusting two components in 2001 to adjusting 12 in 
2009). In turn, it eroded the credibility of the rule,38 put significant strain on the rule-based 
fiscal framework and brought to the fore some shortcomings of the fiscal rule (among them, 
no sanctions when the realized budget differs). 
Seeking to address some these shortcomings and the fallout from the global crisis 
an ad hoc high-level technical advisory committee to the Ministry of Finance (the Corbo 
Commission) has released recommendations to improve and simplify the methodologies used  
                                                                          
34. The Fondo de Estabilización Económica y Social received its first contribution on March 6, 2007, through a 
contribution of $2,580 million from the Fondo de Estabilización de los Ingresos del Cobre dated from 1981. 
35. See Marcel (2010) and Frankel (2011a) for details. 
36. The public sector size, measured as the ratio government expenditure-to-GDP, rose consistently from 18.1% in 
2006 to near 25% in 2009. 
37. There is a terminological question regarding this issue: do automatic stabilisers constitute countercyclical fiscal policy? 
38. In 2009 conceptual changes were also introduced relative to transition from a balance in which only the cyclical 
effects were adjusted to a balance in which the revenues adjustment was intended to follow a kind of permanent income 
concept (transitory taxes, changes in the elasticity of non-mining taxes, change in the methodology for estimating long-
term price of molybdenum and incorporation of cyclical adjustment for the effect of interest income on financial assets). 
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to calculate the structural balance and increase the transparency and accountability of the 
fiscal rule. Authorities have yet to decide which one they will adopt and when (although some 
of them are expected to be put in place starting in 2012). Some of the recommendations for 
the rule upgrading are:39 
• Inclusion of a countercyclical factor (a discretionary action), as the fiscal rule based on 
a structural budget balance is acyclical. The fiscal target as a percentage of GDP in a given year 
(b*) would consist in that case of the cyclically neutral target, to be set at the beginning of the 
four-year presidential term, plus a countercyclical component. This countercyclical component is 
to be activated by a predetermined negative output gap and would be subject to two 
constraints: i) take the form of nonpermanent expenditure changes and/or temporary tax 
adjustments easily reversible; and, ii) a ceiling of 0.5% of GDP per annum. 
• Escape clauses: Target compliance can be temporarily suspended in the event of a 
significant shock (natural catastrophes, military conflicts or major economic crisis). Post-crisis 
convergence to the target is to be gradual, but it should not exceed three years in order to 
maintain intertemporal fiscal strength. 
• Primary spending should be the basis for the fiscal rule. This would insulate the 
cyclically adjusted balance from interest rate changes and procyclical bias of revenue coming 
from rule-based asset accumulation (return on accrued financial assets may not be in line with 
the long-term interest rates). 
• Copper price smoothing: The impact of sharp changes in the estimated long term 
copper price on cyclically adjusted revenue and, therefore, on spending should be 
smoothened by either adjusting the fiscal target or estimating its trend price. 
• Ex post target compliance: midyear monitoring and correction of cyclically adjusted 
balance deviations from its target. This requirement would be mandated by law. 
• Exclusion of transitory fiscal provisions. The cyclically adjusted balance would 
exclude the impact of temporary fiscal measures such as tax hikes or reductions. This would 
prevent financing permanent spending with transitory revenue. 
• Elimination of the cyclical correction on the return on accrued financial assets. 
• Establishment of an independent fiscal council to evaluate the fiscal rule 
methodology, provide assumptions and projections for variables required to calculate the 
cyclical adjustment, assess medium-term and long-term sustainability, evaluate cases when 
exit clauses are invoked, etc. 
                                                                          
39. See Caballero et al. (2011). 
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After incorporating the recommendations on the methodology of estimating the 
structural balance presented by the advisory committee in its report, there was a 
reassessment of the results of structural balance which are shown in Table 4. Given these 
changes, the structural deficit as a percentage of GDP for 2009 was re-estimated from 1.1% 
to 3%. Additionally, after the earthquake and tsunami of February 2010, the Piñera 
administration approved a package of temporary and permanent increases in taxes and 
spending reallocations to finance the substantial cost of reconstruction (4.2% of GDP) and 
announced that it could not commit to restoring the structural balance by the end of its time 
in office. As a consequence, the new government proposed a goal of convergence of the 
structural deficit to 1% of GDP in 2014, reducing the structural deficit each year.  
3.4 Colombia 40 
The Colombian 1991 Constitution states that the country is a state organized in the form of 
a single, decentralized Republic with autonomous subnational divisions. The Nation is 
required to transfer funds to SNGs to finance education, health, potable water and other 
general purpose services. These funds are very rigid and cannot be used to cover any 
debt. Another important transfer comes from the royalties from the extraction of 
nonrenewable resources. Apart from it, SNGs are free to regulate taxes tied to 
consumption, property taxes and fines and penalties. 
Colombia’s early fiscal rules were applicable only to SNGs and aimed to strengthen 
central government’s control over subnational debt, within the context of increasing political 
decentralisation. The first law (Ley Nº 358 de Semáforos) was passed in 1997. It introduced a 
rating system for territorial governments to show solvency and sustainability based on debt 
indicators, banning borrowing (nationally or internationally) for highly indebted local 
governments through financial institutions or through the capital market (red light) and 
requiring authorization from the Ministry of Finance for intermediate cases (yellow light). The 
entities with poor ratings were required to implement fiscal stabilisation plans. The law was 
not effective and many red light local governments were able to incur new debt, including by 
presenting defective financial information. Subnational debt still grew by 15 percent a year in 
1998-2000. A new law (Ley Nº 617 de Responsabilidad Fiscal Territorial) was passed in 2000 
and established a set of rules for SNGs, limiting operating expenditures based on the entity’s 
freely disposable revenues, and also requiring fiscal adjustment plans in case of 
noncompliance with the laws, to be monitored by the Ministry of Finance. 
A law applicable to all levels of government (Ley Nº 819 de Responsabilidad Fiscal) 
was passed in 2003,41 containing both procedural and numerical rules. Before June 15 each 
year, the National Government has to present to the Economic Commissions of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, a Medium Term Fiscal Framework, which will be studied 
and discussed during the first debate of the Law annual Budget. This report states fiscal and 
macroeconomic objectives. On numerical rules, the law requires that fiscal management at all 
levels of government be consistent with debt sustainability. Each year the central government 
determines a primary surplus target for the next year for the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) 
and indicative targets for the primary surplus of the ten following years and the corresponding 
debt trajectory.42 This target will be approved by the Consejo Nacional de Política Económica 
y Social, CONPES, upon advice of Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal, CONFIS. The report 
                                                                          
40. The main sources for this section are Lozano et al. (2008) and Comite Técnico Interinstitucional (2010). 
41. This law was complemented by Decreto 4730 in 2005. 
42. The primary surplus targets, on average, may not be less than the structural primary surplus which ensures the 
sustainability of debt. 
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must include, in case of failure to meet targets set in the Medium Term Fiscal Framework 
last year, an explanation of any deviation from the goals and steps to correct them in a way 
that the sustainability of public debt is ensured. Table 5 shows the NFPS primary surplus 
targets for the next year as set in the Medium Term Fiscal Framework report and its 
realization since 2005. 
Ley Nº 819 de Responsabilidad Fiscal also reinforces the indicators established in 
previous legislation (e.g., ceilings on debt service, the ratio of debt stock to current revenues, 
debt stock, and expenditures). SNGs may take out loans if they meet certain criteria in terms 
of amount of indebtedness, term, and method of payment, among other things. 
Noncomplying entities are required to implement fiscal adjustment plans and official 
guarantees for debt refinancing purposes apply only to SNGs undergoing these adjustment 
plans. Personal sanctions for public officials also apply according to the Disciplinary Law. The 
law fosters market enforcement mechanisms by applying bankruptcy procedures to 
municipalities (Ley Nº 550 of 1999) and requiring main municipalities and departments to 
obtain credit ratings from private companies. All the debt regulations for SNGs were put in 
place when overall credit metrics were highly stressed for them. Today’s financial discipline 
has considerably improved as local governments have posted surpluses since 2001. 
However, the deficit of the central government has remained large. 
In 2011 constitutional amendments were approved in Congress. It included: i) the 
incorporation of the criterion of fiscal sustainability in the Constitution (articles 334, 339 and 
346); ii) a more efficient management of the royalties,43 and, iii) the adoption of a fiscal rule 
on central government finances (Ley Nº 1.473). This fiscal rule is modelled on the Chilean 
one and specific regulations are being developed.44 The aim is to ensure fiscal discipline, 
enhance countercyclical fiscal policy, and improve the management of commodity 
revenues. As of 2014, fiscal policy will be guided for the achievement of cyclically adjusted 
balance target (b*) of the central government45 according to the following expression 
(variables are defined as percentages of GDP): 
bt = b* + α yt + ccipt, 
where b is primary fiscal balance, b* is the targeted structural primary balance (primary 
balance adjusted for economic, commodity cycles and extraordinary items); y is the output 
gap (as a % of potencial GDP) and ccip represents the excess oil revenues (from either higher 
                                                                          
43.The reform on royalties (articles 360 and 361 of the Constitution) means that resources from that source will focus on 
science and technology, retirement savings, regional development projects, physical investments in education and public 
savings. The administration of such resources will be carried out by territorial entities and will be overseen by the central 
government. 
44. Rulemaking of various matters is still pending, including the definition of structural deficit, counter-cyclical 
expenditure, and exceptions to compliance to the fiscal rule.  
45. The authorities opted for a fiscal rule focused on the central government on the grounds that it was preferable to 
define targets on variables that were under the direct control of the government in spite of the fact that if the fiscal rule 
had covered the consolidated public sector the overall debt target had been better anchored. 
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than expected oil prices or production above a determined baseline) generated by Ecopetrol, 
the national oil company, and from other minerals. Spending by the central government will 
be, therefore, a function of trend real GDP growth and the long-term oil and other mineral 
prices. The targeted primary structural deficits (b*) are no higher than 1% of GDP from 2022 
onwards with a transitory period (lower than 2.3% in 2014 and lower than 1.9% in 2018). 
They are determined by the primary balances which allow reducing public debt from 45% of 
GDP in 2011 to below 30% by 2020 (level of debt consistent with an investment grade 
according to international evidence for emerging countries). Related to this proposal, while it 
appears to make sense to delay a fiscal adjustment until economic recovery is better rooted, 
the bulk of the effort is reserved for the second half of the decade. This raises uncertainties 
about shifting political or economic winds in the coming years. The parameter α is defined as 
the sensitivity of fiscal balance to the output gap and aims to combine two elements: a 
countercyclical fiscal policy (0.18) and automatic stabilisers (0.12). Therefore, the value of α is 
0.3, which means that the primary balance can deviate from its goal (b*) in 0.3% of GDP for 
each point of the output gap. 
Taking another cue from Chile, excess oil revenues would be used to prepay debt 
and to capitalize a sovereign wealth fund (Fondo de Ahorro y Estabilización Fiscal y 
Macroeconómica) managed by the central bank. The approved legislation on fiscal rule also 
includes escape clauses46 to cope with large exogenous shocks which could jeopardize the 
macroeconomic stability of the country and the setting up of a council of independent experts 
(Comité Externo para la Evaluación de la Regla Fiscal) to advise the government on technical 
issues and to verify the fulfillment of the fiscal rule every year. And the rule contemplates a 
notional or control account, which records the deviations between the results at year's end 
and the target. When the accumulated notional account reaches –0.5% of GDP, the 
government must set goals in the next two years (0.3% of GDP in the first year and 0.2% of 
GDP in the second) to correct it. If the difference exceeds this limit, it must be fully corrected 
in the following year, in addition to the adjustment already planned. 
3.5 Mexico 47 
The Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria was adopted in 2006. Apart 
from requiring the government to present the annual budget in the context of a medium-term 
framework with projections covering the subsequent five years, the law established a zero 
fiscal target for the “traditional” public sector balance (which includes the federal government, 
two social security systems and some public enterprises  – including the national company 
PEMEX –  but excludes state and local governments), mechanisms for budgeting under oil 
price uncertainty and a system of oil funds. Oil plays a very important role in the public 
finances as oil-related revenue accounts for 30-40 percent of total revenue. As the rule 
targets a cash balance, the rule excludes accruals registered under long-term contracts to 
develop and manage infraestructure projects (PIDIREGAS), the impact on the fiscal balance of 
state owned development banks, etc. (the so-called “augmented” balance). Therefore, the 
rule for the so-called “traditional” balance can be written when designing the budget as 
G – T (P*, Y*) = 0, 
                                                                          
46. Countercyclical fiscal stimulus is permitted if the projected growth rate falls at least two percentage points below the 
long-term growth rate and the output gap is negative. The fiscal stimulus has to be below 20% of the estimated negative 
output gap and will be transitory as it has to be dismantled completely over a period of two years, with a requirement 
that in the first year of that period the economy should register an economic growth rate equal to or greater than its real 
economic growth in the long run. It has to be subject to the favorable opinion of CONFIS (an internal fiscal council 
headed by the Finance Minister). 
47. The main source is IMF (2010b). 
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where G = public sector expenditure; T = public sector revenue; P* = oil price parameter in 
the budget which for each year is projected using a reference oil price, with a weight of ¾ 
being given to oil futures prices and a weight of ¼ to the average oil price of the last 10 years; 
and, Y* = expected output. So that when extra revenues (ER) are observed (from oil prices being 
higher than the reference price and/or observed output being higher than expected output), 
G – T (P*, Y*) –ER (P-P*, Y-Y*)= 0, 
they may first be used to compensate for certain nonprogrammable budget overruns (natural 
disasters, f.e.). The remainder is split among 4 first-tier funds48 (oil, pensions’ restructuring, 
PEMEX and investment by federal entities). Once the first tier reserve funds reached their 
statutory ceilings (totaling about 1.5% of GDP), any subsequent excesses were to be 
allocated to a second tier of funds that finance investment by subnational governments (50%), 
PEMEX investment (25%), and a fund to finance future costs of pension reform (25%). If over 
the course of a fiscal year expected revenue does not meet projections (i.e., actual oil 
revenues turn out to be lower than budgeted due to lower oil prices or exchange rate effects), 
the government can cut expenditures to balance the budget or the stabilisation funds may 
make transfers to the budget to cover the shortfalls. However, since the law placed a cap on 
the saving of excess revenues, by the end of 2008 these funds amounted to 1.8% of GDP, 
despite an unprecedented boom in oil prices. Without this ceiling on savings, the authorities 
would have had greater capacity to pursue countercyclical policies during the crisis. In any 
case, by December 2011 the funds contained the equivalent of just 0.3% of GDP in assets as 
the authorities paid for the oil hedge,49 increased PEMEX investment and diverted money to 
infrastructure spending. Additionally, if non-oil revenues are below their potential due to a 
negative output gap, there can be a deficit equivalent to the shortfall. 
Important developments concerning the fiscal framework took place in 2008-10, at a 
time when the Mexican economy was hit by the global financial crisis. Fiscal stimulus measures 
were adopted between 2008 and 2009 amounting to 2.5% of GDP (increased transfers to low 
income families and communities, increase in public investment, and injection of additional 
credit, channeled primarily through the state-owned development banking system, with priority 
to small and medium-sized enterprises). But this countercyclical easing in the midst of a deep 
recession of the Mexican economy was only possible because some decisions were adopted 
concerning the Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria. In October 2008 the 
law was adapted such that from 2009 PEMEX will no longer make investments through the 
scheme known as PIDIREGAS which was out of the “traditional” balance. But the target for the 
“traditional” rule embedded in the fiscal rule excluded the PEMEX investment. The congress also 
approved a modification of the balanced budget target of the Fiscal Responsibility Law,50 which 
as can be seen in Table 6 eased the fiscal stance by about 0.6 percent of GDP in 2009. 
Exceptional circumstances were also invoked in the budgets of 2010 and 2011 to maintain 
moderate fiscal deficits in those years. In late 2009 and early 2010 in a bid to strengthen 
the sustainability of fiscal policy in the medium term and with the first signs of domestic  
 
                                                                          
48. Mexico implemented an oil stabilisations fund in 2000. A part of government revenues in excess of budgeted 
amounts was to be transferred to the fund. At first, fund resources could only be used if oil export revenues fell by more 
than US$1.5 a barrel below the reference oil price in the budget. In 2002, the rules were changed to allow for full 
compensation of shortfalls. During that year the fund’s accumulated resources were fully drawn. 
49. In the last years the Mexican government has limited revenue volatility by hedging oil revenues against declines by 
buying put options on financial markets. The put options provide the government with an oil price similar to that in the 
budget, even when oil prices fall well below the budgeted price as during 2009. 
50. This requires explicit justification on the part of the legislative branch and must provide a plan for returning to 
zero balance. 
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economic recovery, the authorities adopted a package of fiscal measures to reduce the 
public deficit gradually. 
Also in 2010 the caps on the accumulated resources in some of the funds were 
waived temporarily for 2010 and 2011, with the intention of ultimately removing them 
permanently in the fiscal rule. This would make the fiscal position more symmetric over the 
business cycle. At the end of 2011 the stabilisation funds had accumulated 0.8% of GDP. 
The Mexican a priori balanced budget rule is pro-cyclical as it implies high public 
spending when economic activity and revenues are buoyant, and spending restraint 
when economic activity and revenues are weak. Many analysts also suggest that the 
government should consider accumulating a buffer of financial assets not only during 
economic upturns but over the business cycles as a whole to reduce this cyclical 
vulnerability of the public finances and increase the authorities' capacity to counter the 
impacts of negative shocks on public revenues. Additionally, the balance budget is done 
on a year-by-year basis and lacks a broader medium term outlook of three to five years. 
Apart from these needs, the Mexican sustainability of fiscal policy faces two major 
structural problems: (i) the decline in oil production which has been offset by the 
significant increase in oil prices; and, (ii) the low rate of non-oil taxation as the domestic 
tax burden is well below that of countries at similar levels of development.51 
3.6 Peru 52 
Fiscal performance in Peru improved up until the mid-1990s, with the overall balance of the 
nonfinancial public sector reaching a surplus in 1997. However, fiscal performance 
deteriorated in the following years: the overall surplus achieved in 1997 had turned into a 
deficit of 3 percent of GDP by 1999, with public debt rising to nearly 50 percent of GDP. 
Therefore, as a permanent institutional device to promote fiscal discipline in a credible, 
predictable, and transparent manner Ley Nº 27.245 de Prudencia y Transparencia Fiscal was 
enacted in December 1999 and came into effect in 2000. 
The law contained both procedural and numerical rules. The numerical rule includes 
caps on the public balance and on the real current expenditure for the nonfinancial public 
sector and general government, respectively. It allowed for an overall non financial public 
sector deficit of up to 1% of GDP from 2002 (the deficit ceilings for 2000-02 featured a 
declining path, from 2% of GDP in 2000 to 1% of GDP in 2002), while capping the increase in 
real nonfinancial expenditures of the general government to 2%, using the GDP deflator to 
calculate the nominal increase. Also during the first seven months of an election year, 
nonfinancial expenditure of the general government cannot exceed 60 percent of the 
                                                                          
51. In the last 20 years non-oil revenues averaged just fewer than 10% of GDP. 
52. The main sources for this section are IMF (2010a) and IMF (2012). 
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budgeted annual amount; and the fiscal deficit of the nonfinancial public sector in the first 
semester of an election year cannot exceed 50 percent of the budgeted annual deficit to 
prevent outgoing administrations from engineering an opportunistic fiscal expansion. 
Sanctions are only institutional. There are no specific individual sanctions, but officials must 
comply with the fiscal rule according to the rules and principles of the Law on Ethics of Public 
Service. The law also included an escape clause that allowed for a temporary (one year) 
relaxation of the target in case of national emergency or international crisis. It had to be 
approved by Congress at the request of the Executive. Moreover, when there was sufficient 
evidence (with a report from the Minister of Economy and Finance) that the GDP was 
declining or could decline in the following fiscal year, the deficit target could be missed (never 
exceeding two per cent of GDP). 
The Ley Nº 27.245 was partially modified in 2003 (Ley Nº 27.958 de 
Responsabilidad y Transparencia Fiscal) with a clear objective of debt consolidation due 
to the fact that in 2002-03 regional governments were created and obtained substantial 
fiscal autonomy, including the right to borrow.53 The national government transferred 
important responsibilities and fiscal resources to regional governments and reinforced the 
existing local (municipal) governments. In fact, both levels of subnational governments 
doubled their budget revenues in only five years. However, they are mostly financed by 
national government transfers instead of own collected taxes. The fiscal rules applicable 
to SNGs are established in the Legislative Decree Nº 955 (Ley de Descentralización 
Fiscal) in 2004: i) the relationship between the annual total debt stock and the current 
revenue of regional and local governments should not exceed 100 percent; ii) the ratio of 
annual debt service to current income must be below 25 percent; and, iii) the moving 
average of the primary outcome of three years must show a positive value for each 
regional and local governments. The fiscal rule also provides that failure of fiscal rules in 
the regional and local governments restrict access to intergovernmental funds54 and that 
the government through Emergency Decree can adopt fiscal measures aimed at 
stabilizing public finances of these entities. SNGs need the central government’s 
guarantee to contract external debt, which must be allocated to finance infrastructure. 
However, there have been high and increasing rates of non-compliance at the 
subnational level and no SNG has received sanctions. This is probably due to the fact 
that the subnational public finances in Peru never deteriorated to the point where it 
adversely affected the country’s financial sector or macroeconomic stability. 
Further changes in the Ley Nº 27.958 were: i) the cap to the increase in real 
nonfinancial expenditures of the general government was raised from 2% to 3%; ii) the 
budgeted fiscal deficit of the nonfinancial public sector in the first semester of an election year 
cannot exceed 40 percent of the budgeted annual deficit instead of 50 percent as in the 1999 
law; and, iii) some modifications in the escape clause (extension up to three years and a new 
numerical ceiling of 2.5 per cent of GDP for the deficit). 
More procedural (fiscal transparency provisions) and numerical changes were 
introduced in 2007 (Ley Nº 29.035) and 2008 (Ley Nº 29.144). In 2007 the coverage of 
expenditure under the rule was narrowed from nonfinancial expenditure to consumption 
                                                                          
53. Decentralisation came relatively late to Peru, as part of a democratic reaction after Fujimori’s exit in 2001. The 2002 
decentralisation law foresaw having half or more of public sector spending managed and to some extent allocated by 
SNGs, compared to the previous situation where SNGs managed less than 10 per cent of public spending. 
54. The National Decentralisation Council can deny access for 90 days to conditional transfers to regions not complying 
with the fiscal rules during two consecutive years.  
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expenditure of the central government (wages and salaries, goods and services, and 
pensions)55 and this expenditure was deflated by the inflation target of the central bank to 
calculate its real change. 
Regarding the assessment of the fiscal rule, as seen in Table 7, compliance with the 
deficit limits in 2000-02 proved problematic and following repeated breaches, the target was 
loosened in 2003, when a new sliding scale for the deficit was put in place, from 2% of GDP in 
2003 to 1% of GDP in 2005 and thereafter. The compliance improved significantly since 2003 
as mineral and other revenues boomed, and the limits were met with growing margins until 
2008. On the contrary, the expenditure rule, in addition to undergoing several modifications,56 
did not provide a binding constraint during the upswing as the fiscal rule and did not help 
anchor the fiscal policy formulation process and moderate procyclicality. In any case, due to the 
booming of revenues, the Peruvian government reduced its debt on the upside (the public 
sector gross debt was reduced from 44 percent of GDP in 2004 to 24 in 2010).57 
The global financial crisis put pressure on the fiscal rules. In May 2009 Congress 
approved the waiver presented by the Executive soliciting the relaxation of the fiscal rule to 
allow for a deficit of 2% of GDP in 2009-10 (returning to the 1% limit in 2011) and the 
relaxation of the expenditure rule (to a yearly real change of 4%). In fact, the government 
passed a significant countercyclical fiscal stimulus (3.5% of GDP) as a policy response to 
the crisis: central government’s consumption expenditure was allowed to grow 10% in 
2009 and 8% in 2010, beyond the limits imposed by the fiscal rules, and capital 
expenditure increased by more than 35% in both years. In fact, the Peruvian fiscal rule that 
combines deficit and current expenditure ceilings seems to be well suited to favour public 
infrastructure investment, key to close the significant infrastructure gaps of the region (see 
Carranza et al., 2011). There were, however, low execution rates of capital spending as 
they are mainly made at the subnational level. 
The fiscal rule also created a fiscal stabilisation fund to mitigate cyclical variations. 
The Fondo de Estabilización Fiscal (FEF) accumulates income from the fiscal surplus at the 
end of the year (if current income from ordinary resources exceeded its three previous year’s 
                                                                          
55. Thus, investment spending and expenditure of the local and regional governments were excluded from the spending 
rule. 
56. Changes include not only the use of different deflators and targets for real growth rates, but also the transactional 
coverage to use the cap (from current spending to consumption expenditure). 
57. Similarly, a sound debt management strategy successfully reduced debt vulnerabilities in terms of currency and 
interest rate risks. 
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average in 0.3% of GDP), 10% of net income from each sale of assets for privatization, 10% 
of down payments by state concessions and 30% of funds raised by new royalties for the 
exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources owned by the state, in addition to interest 
from deposits in the FEF. The stabilisation fund may not exceed 4% of GDP. The resources 
exceeding this limit will be used for debt reduction or will go to the Fondo Consolidado de 
Reservas Previsionales. FEF resources may only be used when revenues are at least 0.3 
percent of GDP lower than the average ratio of the last 3 years and GDP declines in two 
consecutive quarters. However, no more than 40 percent of total funds can be used in a 
given year, except when the escape clauses apply. At the end of 2009 it had accumulated 
1.4% of GDP and it was not used during the financial crisis because discretion regarding the 
timing of inflows to the FEF allowed the government to apply the 2008 surplus to the stimulus. 
On 31 March Emergency Decree Nº 012-2011 was passed to achieve the objective of 
increasing the FEF, which amounted to $5.63 billion (3.2% of GDP) at the end of 2011. 
3.7 Venezuela 58 
Venezuela’ history with oil funds goes back a long way. In the mid 1970s following the first oil 
price boom, the Fondo de Inversión de Venezuela (FIV) was created. The objective of the fund 
was to help save a significant share of the oil windfall. In the event, part of the fund’s 
resources was soon diverted to financing domestic investments and taking equity in public 
enterprises that subsequently turned out to be loss makers. Thus while Venezuela’s oil 
exports surged from US$3 billion in 1972 to US$20 billion in 1981, during the period the FIV 
saved only US$2.5 billion at the central bank. In the 1990s, some of the fund’s remaining 
resources were used to support loss-making state companies in the electricity sector – in 
effect, energy subsidies were provided off budget through the use of the FIV’s resources. 
Between 1998 and 2000 a new framework to help manage oil resources was put in 
place. First, an organic budget law was approved in 2000. The law was intended to 
strengthen fiscal policy and reduce public expenditure volatility – a chronic problem in 
Venezuela. It focused on improving the budget process, including the use of a multiyear 
framework, and introduced multiyear numerical fiscal rules for the current balance, 
expenditure growth, and the public debt. Implementation of the law, however, was 
postponed. In 1998, an oil stabilisation fund, the Fondo de Inversión para la Estabilización 
Macroeconómica (FIEM) was created. The objectives of the fund were to help insulate the 
budget and the economy from fluctuations in oil prices. As initially designed in late 1998, 
contributions to the fund were specified as the oil revenues above a reference value 
corresponding to a five year moving average. Resources could only be drawn from the fund in 
a given year if oil revenues were below the reference value or resources in the fund exceeded 
80 percent of the moving average of oil export revenues, in which case resources could be 
used to amortize public debt. The rules of the FIEM were substantially modified in 1999. The 
reference values triggering accumulation or withdrawal of resources were fixed at US$9 a 
barrel. Fifty percent of any oil revenues that accrued at a price above this value were to be 
deposited by the central government, the regional governments and PDVSA (the state oil 
company) in the FIEM. Discretionary withdrawals from the fund with government authorization 
and legislative approval were allowed. In 2001 the FIEM was modified again, and the 
government and PDVSA were exempted from the requirement to make deposits for a while. 
Many further changes were introduced in subsequent years in the context of the annual 
budgets. In 2004 the Fondo de Estabilización Macroeconómica (FEM) was set up to replace 
the FIEM and it did not accumulate any significant resources during 2005-08 when oil prices 
                                                                          
58. The main source for this section is IMF (2010c).  
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surged. Therefore, rules about this fund were frequently changed, ignored, or the operation of 
the fund was temporarily suspended. In fact, the oil fund mostly integrated with overall fiscal 
policy. Even at times, the required deposits could only be made in the fund by taking on 
public debt. It is not strange that according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2010), the 
Venezuelan FEM was given a very negative grade in terms of transparency (just 1 out of 10). 
In summary, the organic budget law and the FIEM/FEM were put in place with the 
objective of improving fiscal performance and smoothing expenditure. Nonetheless, they did 
not achieve this purpose as they did not prevent the implementation of highly procyclical fiscal 
policies. During the boom and in a situation of abundant liquidity generated by resource 
revenues, a number of rules targeting the non-resource balance and the rate of growth of 
expenditure were tested by mounting expenditure pressures. These pressures may have 
been based in part on growing perceptions as time went by that the resource price increases 
were “permanent.” As a result, the rules were not implemented. 
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4 Assessment of fiscal rules in Latin America 
The role of numerical fiscal rules and stabilisation funds in both short run stabilisation and the 
promotion of longer term sustainability have gained increased emphasis in policy and 
academic debates. In theory, well designed and effectively implemented fiscal rules, although 
second best policies, can help reduce time inconsistency in budgetary policies, strengthen 
the credibility of a government’s commitment to fiscal sustainability, and facilitate 
countercyclical fiscal management. However, these effects are difficult to test empirically. The 
rules and funds have been in place for just a few years and there could be some problems, 
related to identification (a potential omitted variable is the political commitment to fiscal 
discipline) and reverse causality (fiscal rules could be adopted to “lock in” gains from 
consolidation). Additionally, many governments have violated their fiscal rules. Hence, it would 
be very useful to have data on the facto rules (an index of enforcement of the jure rules) to 
improve the model’s explanatory power. Lastly, in addition to fiscal rules, two other important 
factors that can explain the improvement of the fiscal policy behaviour are the learning-by-
doing effect from the previous boom and the quality of policymakers. But they are very 
difficult to measure. 
Several econometric studies have found that the existence of fiscal rules is correlated 
with a stronger fiscal performance. Manasse (2006), in a sample of 49 countries, modeled the 
effect of fiscal rules as a dummy variable to explain the primary deficit and found that fiscal 
policy is weakly procyclical and that the presence of a fiscal rule makes it more 
countercyclical. But it is difficult to establish causality due to an endogeneity bias (once the 
quality of institutions is accounted for it could be the case that fiscal rules do not significantly 
affect policy):59 it is more likely that virtuous countries/governments put in place fiscal 
frameworks that are conducive to fiscal sustainability and to a correct policy response to the 
cycle, rather than being such frameworks that make countries/governments more virtuous. 
Dos Reis and Guerson (2006) tried to shed some light on this by simulating a structural 
balance expenditure rule for five Latin American countries using a vector autoregression (VAR) 
framework. They found that if expenditure were set at a fixed percentage of long run 
(structural) government revenue, the volatility of output would always be lower. Caceres et al. 
(2010), using structural breaks in the level or variance of the primary fiscal balance, find limited 
empirical evidence in support of the view that fiscal rules have had a distinguishable effect on 
fiscal performance.60 And Thornton (2009) concludes that fiscal rules have not contributed to 
improvements in fiscal outcomes in emerging markets61. 
With respect to the aim of strengthening the long term sustainability (reducing the 
deficit bias and controlling the growth in public debt) in Latin America, Daude et al. (2011) 
found that sustainability had recently improved (all the countries except Argentina were able 
during the last decade to exhibit fiscal balances above those required to sustain their current 
debt levels), although they did not explicitly attributed it to the fiscal frameworks. 
                                                                          
59. See Frankel et al. (2011). 
60. They find that fiscal rules may have helped anchor efforts to strengthen fiscal policy, but do not seem to have been 
the driver of such efforts. There are nine countries in their sample. Five of them (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru) are from Latin America.  
61. The empirical approach relies on “differences-in-differences” estimation and assumes an arbitrary “treatment date” 
for the control group in the sample. As discussed in this paper, the correct selection of break dates is critical to avoid 
estimation bias. Emerging market economies that did not adopt fiscal rules also experienced improvements in their fiscal 
performance around the same time as the economies which adopted them. 
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Regarding the short term stabilisation aim, IMF (2011a) points out that after 
adopting the rules, fiscal policy was broadly procyclical as real expenditures expanded 
well above the rate of potential economic growth. A different and more common way to 
measure the fiscal stance is through the fiscal impulse, defined as the change in the 
structural primary balance.62 In Figure 1, these fiscal impulses are compared with the 
cyclical position of the economy for six Latin American countries in the period 1992-
2009.63 The chart can be read as follows: the upper right-hand quadrant (an increase in 
the structural balance  –  a positive fiscal impulse –  at a time of economic upturn) and 
the lower left-hand quadrant (decrease in the structural balance  –  a negative fiscal 
impulse – at a time of economic downturn) signal a countercyclical – and thus stabilizing- 
role for fiscal policy. The other two quadrants indicate procyclical fiscal positions. And 
points close to the horizontal axis indicate fiscal episodes that are neutral in relation to 
the economic cycle. The great majority of cycles and fiscal episodes are in the two 
quadrants corresponding to procyclical positions. 
This relationship between fiscal policy and the economic cycle is also evaluated 
through the estimation of simple linear regressions of the variation of the structural budget 
balance (fiscal impulse) on the output gap level. A negative coefficient regression, ˆ  
indicates that a positive output gap is associated with deterioration in the structural balance, 
so that fiscal policy is procyclical, whereas a positive coefficient means that fiscal policy is 
countercyclical (and a zero coefficient means that fiscal policy is acyclical). In Figure 1 linear 
regressions are depicted for two subsamples (1991-2000 and 2001-2009, pre and post fiscal 
rules periods, approximately) and the results of the estimates for the panel data and for each  
                                                                          
62. The fiscal impulse is a measure of whether changes in fiscal policy are adding, or subtracting from, aggregate 
demand pressures in the economy. Therefore, automatic fiscal stabilisers are excluded from this measure. 
63. Our thanks go to Ángel Melguizo of the Inter-American Development Bank for providing me with estimates of 
cyclically adjusted public revenues for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru implementing the 
standardised OECD methodology and extending it to include commodity cycles (following basically the IMF approach in 
Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer, 2008). 
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country are shown in Table 8. Statistically significant negative signs (procyclical fiscal policy) for 
the ˆ are found in the sample with all the countries and for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for the 
whole period. Fiscal policy became acyclical in 2001-2009 in Brazil and some reduction in the 
procyclicality is found in Argentina in the same period (lower ˆ  in absolute terms). According to 
different authors,64 the procyclicality in the post fiscal rule period derives from frequent revisions 
to the numerical targets but also from the rules’ emphasis on balanced budgets or deficit 
ceilings. In this sense, a way to avoid procyclical behaviour in public spending in fiscal rules is to 
replace annual GDP growth as a reference with a measure of the economy’s potential growth 
(defined ex-ante). The ˆ coefficients are not statistically significant for Chile, Colombia, and 
Peru (fiscal policy has been acyclical) in all periods. In the Chilean case that was the aim of its 
fiscal rule: to maintain a constant structural fiscal balance regardless of the business cycle. 
These results are similar to the ones obtained by Daude et al. (2011). Other studies 
(Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer, 2008; and Jimenez and Kacef, 2009) also show that most 
countries of the region conducted a less procyclical (in some cases, a broadly cyclically 
neutral) fiscal policy during the years preceding the recent global financial crisis, utilizing part 
of the revenue boom to reduce their public debt (improving also its structure and 
composition) and, in some cases, to build stabilisation funds. Céspedes and Velasco (2011) 
focus on the behaviour of fiscal variable across the commodity cycle, in contrast to behaviour 
across the output cycle,65 which has been the focus of the earlier research of fiscal 
procyclicality. They find evidence that, contrary to previous commodity boom episodes, in the 
recent episode of increases in commodity prices (2003-08) procyclicality had reduced in most 
of Latin America (with the exception of Venezuela). One of the significant determinants of the 
cyclicality of government expenditures is the existence of a fiscal rule with the expected sign. 
Resisting strong political pressures in those boom years was not easy as shown by 
the Chilean example. In 2007 and 2008, the President of Chile, Michele Bachelet, had a low 
approval rating (see figure 2), especially for the management of the economy. One of the 
 
                                                                          
64. See, for example, Izquierdo and Talvi (2008). 
65. Commodity prices can be claimed to be invariant with respect to policy response in individual commodity-producers 
in the sample, which ensures that the empirical analysis is free from double-causality problems. This is a great advantage 
over much of the previous literature that examines procyclicality with respect to the GDP, which are unquestionably not 
invariant with respect to domestic policy. 
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reasons for this was the popular resentment that the government had resisted intense 
pressure to spend the soaring receipts from copper exports which had been mostly saved. 
However, since mid-2009, Bachelet attained a very high approval rating which kept through 
the remainder of the term. The change took place in a period when the global recession hit 
the Chilean economy (the economy contracted 1.5% in 2009 and unemployment increased 
to its highest level in 5 years, 10%). But the government increased spending sharply, using 
the assets that it had acquired during the copper boom, and thereby moderated the 
downturn. As stated by Frankel (2011a): “…saving for a rainy day made the officials heroes 
when that rainy day comes, but it is very difficult to be a hero in sunny days…”. 
Additionally, calculating the business cycle and the commodity cycle is not 
straightforward. And it is very relevant for the application of rules based on structural 
balances. There is a great degree of uncertainty concerning output gap estimates in Latin 
America as the trends for potential output are compounded with highly volatile cyclical 
shocks. The volatile, uncertain, and exhaustible resource revenues also pose significant 
challenges to fiscal management as it is not easy to distinguish their transitory and permanent 
components (see Baunsgaard et al., 2012). It is a well-known fact that commodity prices are 
highly persistent and it is hard to reject the hypothesis that they follow a “random walk”, i.e., 
that expected tomorrow’s price is equal to today’s price. Moreover, high commodity prices 
tend to coincide with low interest rates, which make borrowing more attractive, especially for 
economies that are net debtors, as most Latin American countries are. Thus, this has led in 
the past to spending in excess due to the price-rise. 
At the same time, the institutional coverage of rules depends on the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation and autonomy of various levels of government (Chile is a relatively centralized 
fiscal system, in Mexico and Peru decentralisation is growing and Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia have more autonomy). Even in the case of decentralized systems there are top-
down systems (Brazil, Colombia, Peru) or cases like Argentina, in which, the federal 
government passed the law only for itself, and this set the framework, incentive, or example for 
the sub-national governments to have their own fiscal rules voluntarily. Therefore, sub-national 
governments are starting off from different levels of development and of mandates of 
expenditures. And fiscal rules cannot substitute for well-designed systems of intergovernmental 
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fiscal relations because introducing hard constraints at the regional level can adversely affect 
the quality of public services. Unfortunately, most countries in the region lack formal forums 
for policy dialogue across government levels, the formulation of subnational budgets is often 
carried out without timely inputs by the central government, and reporting by the regions on 
their budget execution is subject to long delays and based on different accounting rules. 
Additionally, in cases where sub-national governments have accumulated a large stock of 
debt, as in Argentina or Brazil, a fiscal rule has gone hand in hand with a debt rescheduling 
program with the national government. 
In any case, for the first time in recent decades most countries in the region were 
able to avoid a procyclical fiscal response to a negative shock (the 2008-09 global financial 
crisis).66 But another shortcoming of the fiscal rules in Latin America is related to its behaviour 
during the recent global crisis (in the presence of low growth or of external shocks affecting 
commodity prices), as most rules were modified, incorporating escape clauses to limit the 
application of numerical rules or to suspend them following ad hoc procedures because there 
was little room to adjust to shocks. This should only apply in ex ante predefined 
circumstances, be well designed from the start, and require objective analysis and scrutiny to 
invoke their application (including voting rules) to ensure that credibility in the fiscal rule is not 
undermined as shown by the negative experience in Peru’s earlier versions of the fiscal rule. It 
should also specify the path back to the rule and the treatment of accumulated deviations. 
In most countries fiscal councils, i.e. institutions with a specific mandate to assess 
and monitor the implementation and impacts of fiscal policy, do not exist or are institutionally 
weak. Their advice is not binding, critical fiscal policy analysis is almost inexistent67 and 
budgetary accountability and ex-post evaluation is not substantive. Only in Chile an 
independent body sets budget assumptions and methodologies (for the calculation of 
potential GDP and reference commodity prices) which are key inputs into the implementation 
of rules. Therefore, a second generation of fiscal rules in Latin America should also give a 
more prominent role to independent fiscal agencies in their part as complement to fiscal rules 
in order to deal with the informational asymmetries between voters (the principal in the policy 
game) and politicians (see Debrun, Gérard, and Harris, 2012) and to reduce the over-
optimism of governments’ budget forecasts, especially during booms (see Frankel, 2011b). 
                                                                          
66. Headline fiscal balances fell abruptly, whereas structural fiscal balances fell moderately. 
67. Multi-year macroeconomic projections of revenue, expenditure, public investment, and public debt are undertaken 
within the Ministries of Economy and Finance, which are also the actors charged with designing and implementing the 
fiscal policies. Thus, there is room for further strengthening of external formal checks-and-balances. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
A sound design of fiscal rules and their effective implementation and enforcement is 
challenging, since fiscal rules: i) limit the flexibility of policymakers to respond to different 
economic and political challenges, especially in countries with small automatic stabilisers; ii) 
change the balance of power between political actors; iii) involve significant trade-offs among 
different policy objectives; and, iv) have to be tailored to the specific economic and 
institutional characteristics of each country. The state of a country’s financial system also 
matters for the decision to adopt a fiscal rule, and for its design: if the financial system is in a 
precarious state, and likely to require significant government bailouts, a debt rule may quickly 
become untenable. 
Fiscal rules can serve different objectives: promoting fiscal sustainability, providing fiscal 
flexibility (the ability to respond to shocks) in order to promote economic stabilisation, 
containing the size of government, supporting inter-generational equity, increasing public 
infrastructure investment, etc. There is no dominance of one rule over others; rather, each 
involves trade-offs in terms of sustainability, cyclicality, volatility of the main fiscal variables and 
different degrees of implementation challenges (use of off-budget public entities, 
reclassification of expenditures, creative accounting, complexity of calculating unobserved 
variables, etc.). Each type of fiscal rule has different properties relative to key policy 
objectives. Furthermore, priorities may change over time once gains from past policies are 
achieved, which may justify a change of the fiscal rule in place. 
As seen in the previous sections, there is a wide variety of fiscal rules in Latin America and 
their targets differ across countries. For example, rules on budget balance are subject to 
variations: overall balance, current balance (or golden rule, so as to avoid the crowding-out of 
much-needed public investment). In some countries, the budget balance rule is accompanied 
by additional limits on total government expenditures, or the fastest growing components of 
fiscal expenditure: primary (non-interest) outlays, interest payments, and/or the wage bill. In 
other countries less procyclical but more demanding information and institutional design rules 
have been adopted. 
Institutional coverage depends on the degree of decentralisation of the fiscal systems in the 
different countries; however, in light of experience, trusting market-based approaches to 
control sub-national borrowing is not advisable, and there is scope for enforceable sub-
national fiscal rules. 
Fiscal rules in Latin America (perhaps with the exceptions of Brazil and Chile) generally made 
a poor start and were repeatedly modified after first being adopted, amid fiscal performance 
slippages. This survey has studied whether they have served two main objectives: fiscal 
sustainability and the capacity to respond to shocks. It shows that the former objective has 
been better served.68 The survey has also offered some suggestions to improve fiscal rule 
frameworks (better accounting for economic shocks). In any case, although fiscal rules can 
help, they are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve fiscal discipline. Indeed, fiscal rules 
can be regarded as a formal expression of the political will to maintain fiscal discipline: a rules-
based fiscal policy without the political will to enforce will fail. 
                                                                          
68. Other concerns regarding the functioning of fiscal rules are the risks of distracting from spending priorities, or 
undermining transparency due to incentives for creative accounting (IMF, 2009b). 
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